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Punitive Damages: An Appeal for
Deterrence
Nebraska is one of only four jurisdictions where punitive dam-
ages1 in civil suits are not recognized.2 It is, however, the only state
which finds such damages to be unconstitutional.3 While punitive
damages are often criticized 4 and susceptible to abuse,5 this Com-
ment will outline areas in which punitive damages are necessary
for the maintenance of order and peace in society. Also a set of
guidelines will be developed which best utilize the purposes of pu-
nitive damages while at the same time curbing any abuses inher-
ent in such awards.
1. Punitive or exemplary damages are "awarded to the plaintiff over and above
what will barely compensate him for his property loss, where the wrong done
to him was aggravated by circumstances of violence, oppression, malice,
fraud, or wanton and wicked conduct on the part of the defendant." BLAcK's
LAW DICTIONARY 352 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
2. Louisiana: Boutte v. Hargrove, 277 So. 2d 757 (La. Ct. App. 1973); Massachu-
setts: City of Lowell v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 313 Mass. 257, 47
N.E.2d 265 (1943); Nebraska: Abel v. Conover, 170 Neb. 926, 104 N.W.2d 684
(1960); Washington: Maki v. Aluminum Bldg. Prods., 73 Wash. 2d 23, 436 P.2d
186 (1968).
3. Abel v. Conover, 170 Neb. 926, 931, 104 N.W.2d 684, 689 (1960), held that puni-
tive damages were violative of the due process clauses of the Nebraska and
United States Constitutions when read with article VII, section 5 of the state
constitution which requires that all fines and penalties go to the counties for
the support of public schools.
4. See, e.g., Duffy, Punitive Damages: A Doctrine Which Should be Abolished,
THE CASE AGAINST PuNrrIvE DAMAGES 4 (Defense Research Institute Mono-
graph 1969); Ghiardi, Should Punitive Damages be Abolished?-A Statement
for the Affirmative, 1965 ABA PROCEEDINGS, SECTION OF INS., NEGLIGENCE AND
COMPENSATION LAw 282; Long, Punitive Damages; An Unsettled Doctrine, 25
DRAKE L. REV. 870, 888-89 (1976).
5. Juries are generally given little guidance and the award is largely within the
discretion of the jury. This makes the award highly susceptible to passion
and prejudice. See Duffy, supra note 4. Another area of potential abuse is
that the defendant is subject to both criminal and civil punishment when pu-
nitive damages are allowed. This can lead not only to over punishment of the
defendant but also to use of punitive damages for improper reasons. See in-
fra notes 71-76 & accompanying text.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Brief History and Purposes of Punitive Damages
Created in eighteenth century England,6 the doctrine of puni-
tive damages was originally used to justify awards for intangible
injuries such as pain and suffering, embarrassment, inconven-
ience, or other damages difficult to quantify.7 The expansion of
modern tort law and compensatory damages 8 to cover intangible
as well as tangible harms, shifted the theory for punitive damages
to punishment and deterrence.9 This new justification prompted
critics of the doctrine to call for its abandonment on the grounds
that "the purpose for which punitive damages were created no
longer exists."' 0 But legal doctrines frequently serve purposes dif-
ferent from those of their origin. Notably, the fourteenth amend-
ment, which was designed to protect newly freed slaves, has been
applied to a variety of substantive areas."
Modern courts justify punitive damages on three bases:
(1) punishment,12 (2) deterrence,13 and (3) as a private aid to
courts in enforcing established norms of conduct14 by compensat-
ing for otherwise non-compensable injuries.' 5
6. The first punitive damages case was probably Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep.
768 (K.B. 1763) (illegal search and seizure due to blanket warrants issued
against printers and publishers).
7. Long, supra note 4, at 873. Punitive damages were awarded to pay for any
hurt not placated through compensatory damages, such as "indignities asso-
ciated with seduction, deceit in inducing marriage, alienation of affection, and
other improprieties." Id.
8. Compensatory damages serve a reparative function by substituting money
for the plaintiff's loss. By providing money substitutes, the law of torts pre-
serves economic stability. See Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44
HARv. L. REV. 1173, 1173 (1931).
9. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF 'THE LAw OF TORTS § 2 at 9 (4th ed. 1971). See also
Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851) (damages may be
awarded an injured party by way of penalty and punishment); Polk, Wilson &
Co. v. Fancher, 38 Tenn. 190, 1 Head 336 (1858) ("[Tlhe damages should be
such as not only to remunerate or compensate the plaintiff, but to operate as
a punishment of defendant[s], and an example to deter others from like of-
fenses.") Id. at 192, 1 Head at 341.
10. Duffy, supra note 4, at 8.
11. Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled Approach, 31 HAs-
TINGS L.J. 639, 644 (1980). "So long as a doctrine continues to serve a neces-
sary policy goal, the fact that it has diverged from its original function does
not provide a basis for abolishing the doctrine. The pertinent question is
whether punitive damages continue to serve a rational policy." Id.
12. See infra notes 16-19 & accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 20-21 & accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 22-26 & accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 22-26 & accompanying text; see also Long, supra note 4, at 875-
76.
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1. Punishment/Retribution
While punishment is one of the most frequently posited rea-
sons for punitive damages, punishment, alone, is a weak justifica-
tion. Arguably, it is irrational to inflict present suffering in order to
remedy past injuries which cannot be undone.16 However, when
punishment is used to control future behavior by putting other
similarly situated persons on notice that like conduct will result in
unpleasant consequences, the usefulness of punitive damages be-
comes apparent.
Punishment also serves the purpose of satisfying the desire for
revenge by society and the aggrieved individual. By gratifying the
instinct of vindictiveness, the award serves as an alternative to
self-help, maintaining peace and order in society.17 For example,
in Alcorn v. Mitchell,18 the court awarded punitive damages
against a defendant who publicly spit in the plaintiffs face. Ratio-
nalizing that the small compensatory award would not prevent the
plaintiff from seeking revenge, the court said:
The act in question was one of the greatest indignity, highly provoca-
tive of retaliation by force, and the law, as far as it may, should afford sub-
stantial protection against such outrages, in the way of liberal damages,
that the public tranquility may be preserved by saving the necessity of
resort to personal violence as the only means of redress. 19
2. Deterrence
As previously mentioned, deterrence and punishment are com-
panion policies justifying punitive damages. The need for punitive
damages and the effect of deterrence is most acute in the situation
where the defendant tacitly determines that he will engage in
wrongful conduct with the expectation of greater profits and run
the risk of later paying compensation for the conduct. In this situa-
tion, the defendant finds it cheaper to pay damages, if necessary,
than to proceed lawfully. If the wrongdoer is assessed compensa-
16. While punishment for vindictiveness sake alone serves no objective consis-
tent with the purpose of punitive damages, punishment inflicted for past acts
which influence future acts is completely justifiable. Mallor & Roberts, supra
note 11, at 648.
17. Justice Holmes once noted.
It certainly may be argued, with some force, that it has never
ceased to be one object of punishment to satisfy the desire for ven-
geance....
The statement may be made stronger still, and it may be said, not
only that the law does, but that it ought to, make the gratification of
revenge an object.
0. HOLMEs, THE COMION LAW 40-41 (1881).
18. 63 Mll. 553 (1872).
19. Id. at 554.
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tory damages, the maximum penalty will merely restore him to the
status quo and he is likely to resort to wrongful conduct again. On
the other hand, if punitive damages exist, the risk of a substantial
penalty may deter his wrongful conduct. An illustrative case, Funk
v. Kerbaugh,20 concerned a defendant who decided it would be
"cheaper to pay damages" 21 for blasting in a manner which de-
stroyed the plaintiff's building, rather than to alter the blasting
method.
3. "Private Attorney General"
The control of antisocial conduct is generally vested with the
criminal justice system, but all outrageous conduct cannot be pun-
ished by government prbsecution.22 Does this mean misconduct
which is not prosecuted should go unregulated? Reason would
suggest otherwise, and many courts have based punitive damage
awards on "the promotion of justice where justice otherwise might
not be served."23 Punitive damages give incentive to an individual
to serve as a "private attorney general" and bring a wrongdoer to
"justice."24 Because all wrongdoing is not subject to criminal sanc-
tion, it is important to encourage individual members of society to
bring suits and to allow monetary sanctions to be imposed against
misconduct. This need is particularly important when the plain-
tiff's damages are minimal and it would be economically unfeasible
to bring suit. For example:
When Y thoughtlessly drives his automobile into a crowded pedestrian
area, X is only slightly injured. No one else is hurt. The results could, and
normally would, have been tragic. Providentially, they were only trivial in
this case. The prospect of punitive damages could induce X to sue Y, who
should be held responsible for his dangerous conduct. Without the pros-
pect of punitive damages, X would not be able to collect a large enough
judgment to make the suit worthwhile.2 5
20. 222 Pa. 18, 70 A. 953 (1908) (per curiam).
21. Id. at 19, 70 A. at 954.
22. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 11, at 649. All anti-social conduct is not classi-
fied as criminal conduct and not subject to state prosecution. Also, limits on
judicial and prosecutorial resources make enforcement of all criminal laws
impossible. See infra notes 77-89 & accompanying text.
23. Long, supra note 4, at 878.
24. Availability of punitive damages may make it worthwhile for plain-
tiffs to sue defendants who should be sued but who, in the absence of
punitive awards, would not be, because of the trifling nature of the
actual damages suffered by the plaintiff. The public interest requires
these defendants to be admonished. The prospect of punitive dam-
ages encourages the plaintiff to seek the admonishment. This motive'
for bringing suit is sometimes discussed under the rubric of the
"bounty" or the "private attorney general" theory.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 404, 179 N.E.2d
497, 498, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488, 490 (1961).
25. Long, supra note 4, at 878.
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In addition to providing a plaintiff a private punitive remedy,
the doctrine encourages individuals to pursue their legal remedies
in lieu of private and often violent self-help remedies.26
B. Unconstitutionality in Nebraska
Despite these justifications, Nebraska courts have refused to
award punitive damages based upon two sections of the Nebraska
Constitution.27 In Boyer v. Barr,28 the first Nebraska case to dis-
cuss punitive damages, the court held such damages to be so op-
pressive as to constitute a violation of the due process clause.29
26. See supra note 17 & accompanying text.
27. The provisions which Nebraska courts have found to disallow punitive dam-
ages are:
Article I, section 3
Sec. 3. Due Process of law. No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.
Article VII, section 5
Sec. 5. Fines, penalties, and license money; allocation. Allfines,
penalties, and license money, arising under the general laws of the
state, except fines and penalties for violation of laws prohibiting the
overloading of vehicles used upon the public roads and highways of
this state, shall belong and be paid over to the counties respectively,
where the same may be levied or imposed, and all fines, penalties,
and license money arising under the rules, by-laws, or ordinances of
cities, villages, precincts, or other municipal subdivision less than a
county, shall belong and be paid over to the same respectively. All
such fines, penalties, and license money shall be appropriated exclu-
sively to the use and support of the common schools in the respective
subdivisions where the same may accrue, except that all fines and
penalties for violation oflaws prohibiting the overloading of vehicles
used upon the public roads and highways shall be placed as follows:
Seventy-five per cent in a fund for state highways, and twenty-five
per cent to the county general fund where the fine or penalty is paid.
(Amended, 1956) (emphasis added).
28. 8 Neb. 68 (1878).
29. Id. at 72. Included in Boyer was the following quotation by Mr. Justice Foster
in Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 397 (1872):
Let the criminal law deal with the criminal, and administer punish-
ment for the legitimate purpose and end of punishment, namely, the
reformation of the offender and the safety of the people. Let the indi-
vidual whose rights are infringed and who has suffered injury go to
the civil courts and there obtain full and ample reparation and com-
pensation; but let him not thus obtain the 'fruits' to which he is not
entitled and which belong to others. Why longer tolerate a false doc-
trine which in practical exemplification deprives a defendant of his
constitutional right of indictment or complaint on oath, before being
called into court--deprives him of the right of meeting the witnesses
against him face to face-deprives him of the right of not being com-
pelled to testify against himself-deprives him of the right of being
acquitted unless the proof of his offense is established beyond all
reasonable doubt-deprives him of the right of not being punished
1982]
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This line of reasoning continued for many years.30 In addition,
there have been slight rumblings that punitive damages are uncon-
stitutional due to article VII, section 5 of the state constitution.3 1
While article VII, section 5 clearly states that all "penalties" are to
be given to the school fund, considerable debate has centered on
what constitutes a penalty.32 The issue was settled in Abel v. Con-
over,33 where the court held: "A statute which imposes liability for
actual damages and additional liability for the same act provides a
penalty."3 4
In Abel, the court found unconstitutional a statute which al-
lowed treble damages against deceitful attorneys. While noting
that similar statutes in other jurisdictions had withstood due pro-
cess scrutiny, the court held that the statute provided for a penalty
clearly violative of the due process clause, when considered in con-
nection with article VII, section 5.35 The standard used to deter-
mine what constitutes a penalty violative of the two sections of the
twice for the same offense? Punitive damages destroy every consti-
tutional safeguard within their reach.
Boyer v. Barr, 8 Neb. at 72.
30. See, e.g., William Deering & Co. v. Miller, 33 Neb. 654, 657, 50 N.W. 1056, 1057
(1892); Boldt v. Budwig, 19 Neb. 739, 745, 28 N.W. 280, 283 (1886); Riewe v. Mc-
Cormick, 11 Neb. 261, 264-65, 9 N.W. 88, 89 (1881).
31. See Atchison & Nebraska R.R. v. Baty, 6 Neb. 37 (1877). After a six page dis-
cussion of the due process clause, the court in dicta said:
Again, it seems clear that the statute in question is incompatible
with another provision of the constitution. It will not be pretended
that the act was intended to define a statutory criminal offense. Still,
it is impossible to regard the excess beyond the value of the property
in any other light than a penalty, not resting in contract, but a pen-
alty or fine for the purpose of punishment; but this penalty or fine is
by the statute given to the party claiming damage for the accidental
loss of his property, and hence the act must come in conflict with that
provision of the constitution which declares that "all fines and penal-
ties," etc., "shall be appropriated exclusively to the use and support
of common schools."
Id. at 45. Article VII, section 5 was placed in the Nebraska Constitution in
1875. Nothing in the history of the adoption of the section suggests that it was
meant to limit the state's police power to provide for punitive damages. Vold,
Constitutionality of Statutory Double or Treble Damages Provisions in Ne-
braska, 19 NEB. L. BuLL. 63, 69 (1940).
32. For a full discussion of penalties, see Vold, supra note 31, at 65-82. Basically,
two lines of reasoning exist as to the meaning of the term penalty. The Ne-
braska Constitution does not supply a definition. One interpretation of pen-
alty is found in Huntington v Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 666-67 (1892), where the
term was held to include only such fines or punishments which could be en-
forced by the state. The other line of reasoning encompasses a much broader
range of actions.
33. 170 Neb. 926, 104 N.W.2d 684 (1960).
34. Id. at 930, 104 N.W.2d at 688. The court rejected the definition of penalty
stated in Huntington and adopted the broad definition of penalty.
35. Id. at 931, 104 N.W.2d at 689.
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constitution appears to be any damages "clearly in excess of com-
pensatory damages." 3 6
Although the case law prior to Abel is inconclusive and ambigu-
ous, 3 7 it now appears that the unconstitutionality of punitive dam-
ages in Nebraska is firmly ensconced, and nothing short of an
overruling of Abel or a constitutional amendment will change the
state of affairs.
EI. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
The United States Supreme Court once said that the doctrine of
punitive damages was so well embedded in American law that to
question the awarding of punitive damages "will not admit of argu-
ment."38 Presently, only Nebraska,39 Massachusetts,4 0 Washing-
ton,4 1 and Louisiana 42 refuse to allow punitive damages. Three
other states, Connecticut,43 Michigan,44 and New Hampshire,4 5 al-
low punitive damages, but only to the extent that they further the
compensatory function of damages. In Connecticut punitive dam-
ages are to be limited to "the amount of expenses of litigation in
the suit, less taxable costs." 46 Indiana has taken a different ap-
proach by allowing punitive damages, but only to the extent that
such conduct is not punishable as a crime.47 If the conduct is crim-
36. Id.
37. One commentator, after reviewing all Nebraska decisions from 1877-1919,
said:
The Nebraska common law cases on exemplary damages nowhere
depend upon or cite for support the school fund section of the Consti-
tution. The judicial language from Boyer v. Barr seems clear, how-
ever, that the idea in mind in that case was that provisions for
exemplary damages involved penalties so oppressive as to constitute
violation of the due process clause of the Constitution.
Vold, supra note 31, at 84.
38. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851).
39. See, e.g., Abel v. Conover, 170 Neb. 926, 104 N.W.2d 684 (1960).
40. See, e.g., City of Lowell v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 313 Mass. 257,
269, 47 N.E.2d 265, 272 (1943) (exemplary damages not allowed unless author-
ized by statute).
41. See, e.g., Maki v. Aluminum Bldg. Prods., 73 Wash. 2d 23, 25, 436 P.2d 186, 187
(1968) (doctrine of punitive damages is unsound in principle and such dam-
ages will not be allowed absent statutory authorization).
42. See, e.g., Boutte v. Hargrove, 277 So. 2d 757, 760 (La. Ct. App. 1973), mod., 290
So. 2d 319 (1974) (punitive damages are not recognized under civil law with-
out a statute).
43. See, e.g., LeBlanc v. Spector, 378 F. Supp. 301, 305-06 (D. Conn. 1973).
44. See, e.g., Wise v. Daniel, 221 Mich. 229, 233, 190 N.W. 746, 747 (1922).
45. See, e.g., Bixby v. Dunlap, 56 N.H. 456, 464-65 (1876).
46. LeBlanc v. Spector, 378 F. Supp. 301, 305 (D. Conn. 1973).
47. Moore v. Waitt, 157 Ind. App. 1, 8,298 N.E.2d 456, 460 (1973); see also Aldridge,
The Indiana Doctrine of Exemplary Damages and Double Jeopardy, 20 IND.
L.J. 123, 123 (1945).
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inal, punitive damages will not be awarded, even if the crime has
not been prosecuted.
A. Standard of Culpability Necessary to Trigger Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are not awarded as a matter of right in any
state.48 A sufficient standard of culpability must be met prior to
receiving a jury instruction for punitive damages. The culpability
standard is based on an individual's mental state and not on his
outward conduct. However, the standard varies from state to state
so that "almost any term that describes misconduct coupled with a
bad state of mind will describe the case for a punitive award. '49 In
48. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9 at 204 (1973).
If the plaintiff proves sufficiently serious misconduct on the defend-
ant's part, the question whether to award punitive damages is left to
the jury, which may or may not make such an award. It is, of course,
for the court to say whether the plaintiff has sufficient proof of aggra-
vated misconduct to warrant leaving the issue to the jury.
Id. at 204-05 (footnotes omitted).
49. Id. at 205 (footnote omitted). Illustrative of the variety of standards are
quotes from several court opinions:
Arizona: Punitive damages are allowed "for gross, wanton, and cul-
pable negligence." Ross v. Clark, 35 Ariz. 60, 68, 274 P. 639, 642 (1929).
Arkansas: "[N] egligence alone, however gross, is not sufficient, and
that there must be an added element of intentional wrong, or, what is
its equivalent, conscious indifference in the face of discovered peril,
from which malice may be inferred." St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Evans, 104
Ark. 89, 93, 148 S.W. 264,265 (1912) (quoting St. Louis Iron Mountain &
S. Ry. v. Dysart, 89 Ark. 261, 268, 116 S.W. 224, 226 (1909)).
Idaho: "[T]hey [exemplary or punitive damages] cannot be recov-
ered unless the evidence shows clearly that the action of the wrong-
doer is wanton, malicious, or gross and outrageous, or where the
facts are such as to imply malice and oppression. . . ." Harrington v.
Hadden, 69 Idaho 22, 24-25, 202 P.2d 236,237 (1949) (quoting Unfried v.
Libert, 20 Idaho 708, 728, 119 P. 885, 891 (1911)).
Illinois: "[Punitive damages] are allowed.., where a wrongful act
is characterized by circumstances of aggravation, such as willfulness,
wantonness, malice, or oppression ... ." Eshelman v. Rawalt, 298
Ill. 192, 196-97, 131 N.E. 675, 677 (1921).
Iowa: "[P]unitive damages are not allowed as a matter of right....
When malice is shown or when a defendant acted with wanton and
reckless disregard of the rights of others, punitive damages may be
allowed as punishment to the defendant and as a deterrent to
others." Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657, 662 (Iowa 1971).
Missouri: " [W ] antonness and recklessness" furnishes a basis for pu-
nitive awards. Jennings v. Cooper, 230 S.W. 325, 328 (Mo. Ct. App.
1921).
Pennsylvania: "Punitive damages will be allowed for torts that are
committed wilfully, maliciously, or so carelessly as to indicate wan-
ton disregard of the rights of the party injured." Thompson v. Swank,
317 Pa. 158, 159, 176 A. 211, 211 (1934).
South Carolina: The jury does not merely have an option but a duty
to award punitive damages "when under proper allegations a plaintiff
[Vol. 61:651
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addition, anything which negates a bad intent precludes punitive
damages. 50 The vague and conflicting interpretations of the vari-
ous state standards led one commentator to generalize "that virtu-
ally any punitive damages guidelines can be construed to fit the
pleasure of the judges and the juries called upon to administer the
justice."5 '
State standards are both judicially and statutorily created and
span "an astounding range of conduct from 'oppression, fraud, or
malice' on the one extreme to 'rudeness' or 'mere caprice' on the
other."52 Statutes generally require a showing of wanton, willful,
or intentional conduct to support a punitive award, but some states
allow punitive damages when gross negligence is established.53
Punitive damages for gross negligence are generally allowed only
when conduct is so extreme as to evince a conscious or criminal
indifference to the safety or rights of others.54 One commentator
has suggested that punitive damages for gross negligence be as-
proves a willful, wanton, reckless, or malicious violation of his
rights." Sample v. Goff Ref. Co., 183 S.C. 399, 410, 191 S.E. 209, 214
(1937).
Long, supra note 4, at 880.
50. See D. DOBBS, supra note 48, § 3.9 at 205.
51. Long, supra note 4, at 881.
52. Id. Illustrative of state statutes are the following.
California:
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1982)
(a) In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from
contract, where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud,
or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may re-
cover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the
defendant.
Colorado:
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102 (1973):
In all civil actions in which damages are assessed by a jury for a
wrong done to the person, or to personal or real property, and the
injury complained of is attended by circumstances of fraud, malice or
insult, or a wanton and reckless disregard of the injured party's
rights and feelings, the jury, in addition to the actual damages sus-
tained by such party, may award him reasonable exemplary
damages.
53. See, e.g., Louisville & N. R.R. v. Hall, 87 Ala. 708, 723, 6 So. 277, 283-84 (1889);
American Fidelity and Cas. Co. v. Farmer, 77 Ga. App. 166, 178, 48 S.E.2d 122,
132 (1948); Clanton v. Chrisman, 174 Okla. 425, 427, 51 P.2d 748, 750 (1935); Goff
v. Lubbock Bldg. Prods., 267 S.W.2d 201, 206 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
54. D. DOBBS, supra note 48, at 206. Such extreme conduct is necessary so as to
continue the deterrence function of punitive damages. Without evidence of a
conscious disregard for another's rights, no deterrence value would exist, and
the only function punitive damages would serve would be that of retribution.
For a good discussion of the punishment value of punitive damages, see Note,
The Imposition of Punishment by Civil Courts: A Reappraisal of Punitive
Damages, 41 N.Y.U. L REv. 1158, 1164-65 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Reappraisal].
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sessed only if the following question is answered affirmatively:
"[D] id the defendant know that he was taking a great risk involv-
ing the rights of others?" 55
Illustrative of the culpability necessary under most gross negli-
gence standards is Claunch v. Bennett.56 In Claunch, the defend-
ant encouraged a friend to drag race with him on a busy city street.
The plaintiff sued for injuries caused when an accident resulted.
Although there was no proof that the defendant desired to cause
harm to others, the fact that he knowingly created such a great risk
of injury was enough to subject him to punitive damages. The use
of an objective standard in Claunch made effective deterrence pos-
sible. If instead, the standard of gross negligence had required
proof that the defendant tacitly decided to take a risk not knowing
that a penalty could be imposed, then retribution and not deter-
rence would have been the sole function of a punitive damage
award.5 7
B. Extent of Liability
Unlike criminal statutes, standards for punitive damages do not
provide gradations of punishment for various offenses. While a
judge may instruct the jury about the weight to be given to a de-
fendant's level of culpability,58 there are no statutorily or judicially
defined maximum or minimum limits to punitive awards. This
open-endedness and broad jury discretion are the major argu-
ments against punitive damages. 59 Juries are generally asked to
render a verdict on the basis of four factors: (1) the grievousness
of the act,60 (2) the degree of culpability,6 1 (3) the potential for
damage,62 and (4) the wealth of the defendant. 63 The admissibility
of the wealth of the defendant has caused considerable debate,64
55. Id. at 1165.
56. 395 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
57. See Reappraisal, supra note 54, at 1165.
58. Evidence of reckless rather than intentional conduct can and should be
presented to the jury in order to mitigate the punitive damages award.
59. See Ghiardi, supra note 4, at 284-85; Long, supra note 4, at 888-89.
60. Both actual and threatened harm should be considered in assessing punitive
damages. Just because the consequences of the act were small is no reason
to let defendant off the hook when he was lucky that harm was not as great as
he intended. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 11, at 667.
61. The more flagrant the conduct the greater the need for deterrence. Focus
must be placed on the duration of the misconduct, the degree of the defend-
ant's awareness of the hazard, and any concealment of the hazard. Mallor &
Roberts, supra note 11, at 667.
62. This focus will allow greater deterrence.
63. See, e.g., Malco, Inc. v. Midwest Aluminum Sales, Inc., 14 Wis. 2d 57, 66, 109
N.W.2d 516, 521 (1961). See also, D. DOBBS, supra note 48, at 206.
64. One commentator noted:
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but it is necessary in order to provide for meaningful deterrence.
For example, a uniform penalty levied for a specified act would
trigger different levels of deterrence. A one thousand dollar award
might greatly deter a poor defendant, but barely concern a wealthy
defendant. While the admissibility of the defendant's wealth is es-
sential to effectuate the deterrent purpose of punitive damages, it
is also necessary to protect the defendant from being rendered
destitute.65
Critics have assailed punitive damages as leading to excessive
jury verdicts. Although possibly true, the argument ignores the
existence of judicial review.66 Most jurisdictions recognize remitti-
tur which allows the plaintiff to choose either a new trial or a lesser
damage award set by the judge.67 If punitive damages are avail-
able, the judge could review the evidence and determine if the jury
verdict was a product of prejudice or passion. If punitive damages
are not available, the jury may award "punitive-like" damages in
the name of pain and suffering (or some other recognized compen-
satory damage), and the court would be less likely to curb jury
abuse. For example, a Wisconsin case was tried three times before
different juries, twice with, and once without a punitive damage
award. Each jury granted the same total award.6 8 Thus, it seems
[Ilt is probable that this very evidence, instead of aiding the jury to
assess a proper verdict, may prejudice them against the defendant
and prevent an impartial judgment, not only on the size of the ver-
dict, but in deciding who shall win the case. It is a good guess that
rich men do not fare well before juries, and the more emphasis
placed on their riches, the less well they fare.
Morris, supra note 8, at 1191. Although a clear majority of states allow the
admission of financial status, several courts still refuse such evidence. See,
e.g., Hensley v. Paul Miller Ford, Inc., 508 S.W.2d 759, 764 (Ky. 1974).
65. See, e.g., Holmes v. Hollingsworth, 234 Ark. 347, 353, 352 S.W.2d 96, 100 (1961);
Miller v. Schnitzer, 78 Nev. 301, 310-11, 371 P.2d 824, 829-30 (1962). It is gener-
ally held that a punitive damage award will not be allowed to the extent that
it would bankrupt a defendant. Although the award should be large enough
to punish and deter future conduct, it should not deprive defendant of all his
assets.
66. The remedy for jury abuse in punitive damage awards is, just like the remedy
for excessive mental anguish or other less than objective jury awards, judicial
supervision and award reduction. Cf Walton v. Bennett, 376 P.2d 240 (Okla.
1962) (court affirmed the damage award after examining the record). For an
excellent discussion of remittiturs and additurs, see Carlin, Remittiturs and
Additurs, 49 W. VA. L. Q. 1 (1942).
67. Reappraisal, supra note 54, at 1171.
68. See Bass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 36 Wis. 450 (1874) (jury awarded $4,500 in
punitive and compensatory damages); 39 Wis. 636 (1876) (jury awarded $4,500
in compensatory damages); 42 Wis. 654 (1877) (jury awarded $2,500 in com-
pensatory damages and $2,000 in punitive damages).
Suggesting the difficulty of isolating punitive from compensatory dam-
ages, one commentator said: "[T]he theory of punitive damages (without the
name) is built into the average juror's value system; the latitude permitted in
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that punitive damages should be forthrightly allowed, leaving to a
reviewing court the opportunity to lessen those punitive damage
awards which are abusive and inconsistent with the facts.
III. ROLE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES: WHEN IMPOSITION
WILL BEST SERVE THEIR PURPOSE
Obviously, punitive damages should only be assessed when,
and if, the purposes for which they were intended will be effectu-
ated.69 Some of those purposes are identical to the functions
served by the criminal justice system.70 The focus of this Com-
ment now turns to when punitive damages can be imposed not
only to meet their purposes, but also to fill any gaps left open by
the criminal law.
A. Conduct Generally Prosecuted as a Crime
Punitive damages are arguably not warranted where the tor-
tious conduct also constitutes a crime which is ordinarily prose-
cuted. This is because the purposes for which punitive damages
are assessed would not be achieved.7 1 First, because of the crimi-
nal prosecution, there is no need to provide incentives for private
actions. 7 2 Second, and more importantly, the deterrent aspect of
punitive damages is far overshadowed by the deterrent effects of a
criminal sanction.7 3 One commentator said: "[N]o matter how
mild the criminal sanction, the possibility of confinement or the
calculating personal injury award[s] is so wide that proof of defendant's out-
rage will enhance some verdicts without express instruction allowing puni-
tive damages." Morris, Punitive Damages in Personal Injury Cases, 21 ORIo
ST. L.J. 216, 226 (1960).
69. See infra notes 71-89 & accompanying text.
70. Both punitive damage sanctions and criminal sanctions serve three func-
tions: (1) retribution-an expression of society's reprehension for certain
conduct, (2) general deterrence--deters others in society from acting simi-
larly, and (3) special deterrence-deters an individual defendant from re-
peating his conduct. The criminal system provides two functions not served
through punitive damages: (1) neutralization-isolates individuals from soci-
ety, and (2) rehabilitation. Reappraisal, supra note 54, at 1161.
71. When conduct is generally prosecuted as a crime, the criminal sanction
serves all the functions of punitive damages and renders such punitive sanc-
tions duplicative and unnecessary. Reappraisal, supra note 54, at 1173-75.
72. Id.
73. Reappraisal, supra note 54, at 1173-75.
The policy attack on punitive damages is most persuasive when
the conduct for which punitive damages are imposed is also punish-
able as a crime. If a defendant has violated a criminal statute, he or
she stands to lose liberty or property in addition to suffering the
stigma of criminal conviction. The argument against the imposition
of punitive damages in such cases is that society's interest in punish-
ing the wrongdoer is served adequately by the criminal system, and
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stigma of a criminal record are greater deterrents to wrongful con-
duct than the mere imposition of monetary sanctions." 74 If deter-
rence75 and private litigation are rendered inconsequential, the
remaining motive for awarding punitive damages is compensation.
If full compensation is the desired result, then statutes which spe-
cifically provide for recovery of attorneys' fees are preferable to
punitive damage awards.7 6
B. Conduct which is Criminal, but Rarely Prosecuted
This is the situation in which the need for punitive damages is
most acute. Limited judicial and prosecutorial resources substan-
tially restrict the number of crimes prosecuted. Consequently,
criminal conduct goes unpunished and similar future conduct is
not deterred.7 7 Individuals can, however, significantly regulate
misconduct when punitive damages encourage private lawsuits to
redress wrongs.7 8 This is particularly true of rarely prosecuted
technical violations of the law such as libel and slander, trespass,
and technical batteries.79 In these instances punitive damages
serve as a substitute for the criminal law and avoid duplication.80
The deterrent value of punitive damages is greatest in affecting
commercial behavior.81 The assessment of compensatory dam-
the imposition of punitive damages would work an unjustifiable
double punishment.
Mallor & Roberts, supra note 11, at 655 (footnote omitted).
74. Reappraisal, supra note 54, at 1173. An additional stigma imposed by the
criminal law is that a criminal record is admissible in a subsequent criminal
proceeding, while the past imposition of punitive damages is not admissible
in subsequent civil proceedings. Id. at 1174.
75. But note, it has been shown that punitive damages in the ordinarily crimi-
nally prosecuted area are still greater deterrents to the very wealthy defend-
ant who would be only slightly deterred if sanctioned with a criminal fine.
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 351 F.2d 702, 719 n.47 (5th Cir. 1965), affd, 388
U.S. 130 (1967).
76. See generally, D. DOBBS, supra note 48, at 194, for situations in which several
jurisdictions have provided for the recovery of attorneys' fees.
77. This group of cases also includes conduct which is not prosecuted because it
no longer reflects the moral views of society, for example, adultery. Reap-
praisal, supra note 54, at 1167.
78. See supra notes 22-26 & accompanying text.
79. See Reappraisal, supra note 54, at 1175.
80. Id. at 1175-76. One commentator noted: "Penalties fixed-at least as to maxi-
mum and minimum-in advance by a legislature which does not have the
particular culprit in mind may not make for effective punishment in particu-
lar cases." Morris, supra note 8, at 1196.
81. This is readily apparent by noting the number of federal statutes which pro-
vide multiple civil penalties in addition to criminal sanctions. See, e.g., 15
U.S.C. § 15 (Supp. IV 1980) (treble damages for private person injured by vio-
lation of antitrust laws); 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1976) (treble damages for private per-
son injured by unfair competition in importing trade); 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1976)
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ages, alone, will, at a minimum, leave the wrongdoer at the status
quo and could even leave him with a profit. In the absence of puni-
tive damages it is often cheaper to take the risk of becoming liable
for compensatory damages, than to proceed in the lawful way.82
This was the situation in Funk v. Kerbaugh83 where the defendant
persisted in recklessly blasting near the plaintiff's property know-
ing it would cause damage. The court found that modified blasting
could have been equally effective without destroying the plaintiff's
property, but the defendants believed "it cheaper to pay damages
for the injury they might cause than to do the work in a different
way."84
Similarly, plea bargaining, suspension of sentences, pardons,
immunity, and parole further erode deterrence in the criminal law.
Supplementing the criminal law with punitive damages in areas
where the deterrence level is low will assure that individuals will
be less likely to freely take risks which will potentially harm
others, because it will no longer be economically feasible. In addi-
tion, punitive sanctions, unlike criminal fines, 85 can be tailored to a
particular defendant to maximize the deterrent effect.86 Punitive
damages, therefore, serve a useful function in the criminal conduct
(authorizes punitive damages in an unlimited amount for person injured by
wire interception); 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (Supp. I 1977) (discretionary award of
up to two times actual damages for violation of minimum wage and overtime
pay provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act); 42 U.S.C. § 3612(b)-(c) (1976)
(authorizes up to $1,000 punitive damages for private person enforcing fair
housing laws).
82. One author commenting on the securities laws said:
The sheer size of purely compensatory recoveries may also have a
significant deterrent effect. This contention, however, ignores one of
the goals of punitive damages in such cases. If recovery is limited to
plaintiffs actual damages, even if profits made by defendant at plain-
tiff's expenses are included, it still may be profitable for defendant to
violate the law, since there is little chance of being discovered in
every fraudulent act.
Comment, Fashioning A Lid for Pandora's Box: A Legitimate Role for Rule
10b-5 in Private Actions Against Insider Trading on a National Stock Ex-
change, 16 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 404, 411 (1969).
83. 222 Pa. 18, 70 A. 953 (1908) (per curiam).
84. Id. at 19, 70 A. at 954. For other cases in the same class, see Morris, supra
note 8, at 1185-88.
85. For due process reasons, criminal fines must be set in advance by the legisla-
ture and as such cannot be tailored to the individual defendant in order to
maximize the deterrent effect. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 11, at 657.
86. Noting this flexibility, one commentator said:
So the punitive damage device as now used provides for almost un-
limited individualization of treatment of defendants. The only limita-
tions are that the burden of the defendant's admonition must be
confined to a money judgment and the jury's determination is sub-
ject to the veto of trial and appellate judges.
Morris, supra note 8, at 1189.
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area. To dispose of their availability merely because a criminal law
exists8 7 is to remove an effective method for deterring outrageous
conduct.
In summary, a middle position should be taken: Punitive dam-
ages should not be awarded where the criminal system fulfills its
role, but should be allowed when they become the only effective
method of regulation.8 8 One commentator found the following to
be a reasonable approach to imposing punitive damages for crimi-
nal conduct:
What is needed in such cases is not a wholesale ban on punitive dam-
ages, but rather a system of getting more information to the trial judge.
The judge should have access to information concerning criminal prosecu-
tions of the defendant to make an informed decision about the propriety of
a punitive damages instruction. If prosecution has been instituted for an
offense that carries a serious penalty, the judge properly could decline the
instruction. If, however, criminal prosecution has not been instituted
against the defendant, or if prosecution has been instituted but the maxi-
mum penalty is unduly slight in relation to the seriousness of the defend-
ant's conduct and ability to pay, punitive damages may be appropriate.
89
C. Non-criminal Conduct
In the absence of criminal sanctions, punishment through civil
litigation is likely to be the only effective means of regulating and
deterring undesirable conduct. Most of these cases involve tor-
tious conduct. Again, an award of punitive damages promotes pri-
vate lawsuits, deters self-help, and "enable[s] society to regulate
effectively undesirable conduct that it chooses not to punish by
criminal sanctions."90 Since there is no overlap in the functions of
punitive damages and the criminal law, punitive damages are ef-
fective in these cases because all of the purposes of the award are
fulfilled.
IV. APPLICATION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Blanket imposition of punitive damages can be, and usually is,
as abusive as not allowing for such damages at all. Therefore, it is
necessary to define the limits of punitive damages and find a work-
able approach for their imposition. Other jurisdictions have de-
lineated five major limitations on punitive damage awards which
will be discussed and analyzed below.
87. See supra note 47 & accompanying text.
88. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 11, at 658.
89. Id. (footnotes omitted).
90. Reappraisal, supra note 54, at 1162 (footnote omitted).
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A. Vicarious Liability
Presently, punitive damages are intended to serve two major
functions: (1) punishment of the wrongdoer, and (2) deterrence of
similar conduct. This sub-section will analyze how and whether
these purposes are served when punitive damages are imposed
upon someone other than the wrongdoer. The issue is whether the
employer should be held vicariously liable for the culpable acts of
his employee. The majority of courts passing on the issue have
held that the principal is strictly liable for the acts of his agent.91
The rationale is that vicarious liability is in the public interest be-
cause it induces employers to exercise greater care in the selection
and supervision of employees. 92
Two other theories have been advanced for the imposition of
punitive damages in this context. First, the "entrepreneur" the-
ory93 suggests that vicarious liability is a social insurance device.
According to the "entrepreneur" theory, the employee is probably
not able to compensate the plaintiff, so without other recourse the
plaintiff remains uncompensated for the loss. But, if the employer
is held liable, he can spread the loss through the business and in-
sure against such losses. Therefore, losses are spread and do not
fall upon the victim.94 The theory rests on the assumption that the
employer is in a better position to spread the loss. This is probably
correct, yet it also limits the usefulness of the entrepreneur theory
as a basis for imposing punitive damages. The entrepreneur the-
ory shifts risks, but this concerns only the reparative (compensa-
tory) function of torts, and not the punitive function.95 Punitive
damages are only to be imposed on the sufficiently culpable actor
in order to punish and deter. If the principal is responsible for the
wrongdoing, the functions of punitive damages are served, but if
the principal is wholly innocent of any wrongdoing, the only pur-
pose for which punitive damages can be imposed is compensa-
tory.96 Since the compensatory function of damages is served
91. See, e.g., Western Coach Corp. v. Vaughn, 9 Ariz. App. 336, 338, 452 P.2d 117,
119 (1969); Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry. of Can., 57 Me. 202, 224 (1869) (lead-
ing case); Taxicab Drivers' Local Union No. 889 v. Pittman, 322 P.2d 159, 168
(Okla. 1957).
92. See Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry. of Can., 57 Me. 202, 224 (1869).
93. For an excellent discussion of the entrepreneur theory, see Smith, Frolic and
Detour (pts. 1 & 2), 23 COLUM. L. REV. 444, 716 (1923); Douglas, Vicarious Lia-
bility and Administration of Risk (pts. 1 & 2), 38 YALE L.J. 584, 720 (1929).
94. Morris, supra note 8, at 1199.
95. Id. at 2000. 'The operation of the doctrine of punitive damages gives the plan-
tiff an undeserved windfall that has nothing to do with the reparative func-
tion, which is duly served (at least in theory) by the allowance of
compensatory damages." Id.
96. This would allow plaintiff double compensation because he is already enti-
tled to any compensatory damages which he can prove.
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without the need for punitive damages, sufficient justification for
the imposition of punitive damages upon an innocent principal is
not apparent.97
The second theory upon which punitive damages are allowed
without proof of the principal's liability, is the "extra-legal punish-
ment" theory.98 This approach suggests that the admonitory func-
tion of punitive damages would be served in the following way:
The master is forced to pay for the wrongdoing of the servant, but
the servant is punished by the master through discharge, refusal to
issue letters of recommendation, denial of advancement, or other
effective admonition.9 9 If punitive damages will encourage em-
ployers to exercise closer control over their servants, there might
be sufficient ground for awarding them in the vicarious liability sit-
uation. But, it has been frequently noted, that vicarious liability
does little to induce employers to better supervise, train, or punish
their employees. 00 Therefore, the strict imposition of punitive
damages under respondeat superior should be rejected because
97. It has been said that. "Compensatory liability without fault is warranted pri-
marily because of its effect on the specific victim-it is the most equitable
means of assuring adequate compensation-and only incidentally because of
its deterrent effect upon the tortfeasor." Note, The Assessment of Punitive
Damages Against an Entrepreneur for the Malicious Torts of His Employees,
70 YALE LJ. 1297, 1304 (1961) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as Entre-
preneur ]. The author continues by saying that the only justification for puni-
tive damages is the effect on future conduct, never for the specific effect on
the victim because he has already been fully compensated. Id. at 1304.
98. See Morris, supra note 8, at 1202-03.
99. This theory has been criticized as ineffective:
The same fact-the servant's financial irresponsibility-which
defeats the operation of the reparative function if the injured person
is confined to an action against the servant, also makes it impossible
to admonish the servant as a tort defendant. So, unless the servant
has committed a crime-which is not often the case-it is impossible
to do anything to him in a law court which will discourage such
wrongs.
Morris, supra note 8, at 1202.
100. See, e.g., Entrepreneur, supra note 97, at 1304.
The likelihood of effective prevention is difficult to ascertain. A more
careful hiring program may weed out some potential miscreants but
certainly not all, given the present state of psychological knowledge
and testing. Neither will any amount of warnings and sanctions
guarantee complete success, for there may always be some individu-
als upon whom such measures will have scant effect. Indeed, an au-
thoritarian atmosphere may nurture the very type of behavior it
seeks to prevent.
Id. See also Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry. of Can., 57 Me. 202, 266-67 (1869)
(dissent):
[H] ow shall the corporation avoid the constant recurrence of penal-
ties for the offenses of others? Can they, when they select another
servant, exercise any more care or be more watchful over him? Can
they change the passions of men? What is their fault if they have
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the purposes for punitive damages are not served and "the loss
will fall either upon the public, as where the employer is capable of
passing it on by price increases, or upon shareholders, who are
completey innocent and who usually get nothing from the mali-
cious tort of the subordinate employee."'' 1
A minority of courts, following the Restatement of Torts, 0 2 hold
the principal not liable for the acts of his agent unless he has par-
ticipated in or ratified the agent's conduct. 0 3 The leading case em-
exercised all the care, wisdom, and prudence with which men are in-
vested? Must they be punished for not being omnipotent?
If the punishment, thus inflicted, is to serve as a warning to
others, who must take warning? Evidently the innocent as well as
the guilty. The innocent are to be the greatest sufferers by reason of
the offense, and punished alone directly. It is to serve as a warning to
all innocent persons, that they may be punished for the offenses of
others, after having fully compensated the injury done.
Id.
101. D. DOBBS, supra note 48, at 214.
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (1979):
Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a master or
other principal because of an act by an agent if, but only if,
(a) the principal or a managerial agent authorized the doing and
the manner of the act, or
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal or a managerial agent
was reckless in employing him, or
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was
acting in the scope of employment, or
(d) the principal or a manager agent of the principal ratified or
approved the act.
103. States following this rule include: California, McInerney v. United R.R. of
S.F., 50 Cal. App. 538, 549, 195 P. 958, 962 (1920); Connecticut, Maisenbacker v.
Society Concordia, 71 Conn. 369, 379-80, 42 A. 67, 70 (1899); District of Colum-
bia, De Foe v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 123 A.2d 920, 923 (D.C. 1956); Idaho,
Curtis v. Siebrand Bros. Circus & Carnival Co., 68 Idaho 285, 305, 194 P.2d 281,
293 (1948); New Jersey, Kelleher v. Detroit Motors, 52 N.J. Super. 247, 252, 145
A.2d 335, 338 (App. Div. 1958); New York, Kutner v. Fargo, 20 Misc. 207, 208, 45
N.Y.S. 753, 753 (Sup. Ct. 1897), affd, 34 A.D. 317, 54 N.Y.S. 332 (1898); North
Dakota, Rickbeil v. Grafton Deaconess Hosp., 74 N.D. 525, 550, 23 N.W.2d 247,
260 (1946); Ohio, Curry v. Big Bears Store, 142 N.E.2d 684, 685 (1956); Oregon,
Fuller v. Blanc, 160 Or. 50, 58, 83 P.2d 434,435 (1938); Gill v. Selling, 125 Or. 587,
593, 267 P. 812, 814-15 (1928) (dictum), affd on rehearing, 126 Or. 584, 270 P. 411
(1928); Rhode Island, Hagan v. Providence & W. R.R., 3 RL 88, 89-91 (1854);
South Carolina, Turman v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 105 S.C. 287, 289, 89 S.E.
655, 656 (1916); Texas, Fort Worth Elevators Co. v. Russell, 123 Tex. 128, 144, 70
S.W.2d 397, 408 (1934); Vermont, Sparrow v. Vermont Say. Bank, 95 Vt. 29, 32,
112 A. 205, 206 (1921); Virginia, Tri-State Coach Corp. v. Walsh, 188 Va. 299,
309, 49 S.E.2d 363, 368 (1948).
The application of this position is illustrated by the following examples
taken from the Comment to RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 909 (1939):
Illustrations:
1. A employs an ejectment company to dispossess a tenant. A
knows that the company has a reputation for using undue force in
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ploying this rationale is Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway
Co. v. Prentice.104 The case held:
Exemplary or punitive damages, being awarded, not by way of com-
pensation to the sufferer, but by way of punishment of the offender, and as
a warning to others, can only be awarded against one who has participated
in the offence. A principal, therefore, though of course liable to make com-
pensation for injuries done by his agent within the scope of his employ-
ment, cannot be held liable for exemplary or punitive damages, merely by
reason of wanton, oppressive or malicious intent on the part of the
agent.10
5
In Lake Shore, the railroad company was found not liable for puni-
tive damages for the illegal, wanton, and oppressive arrest of a pas-
senger by a conductor on one of the company's trains. 06 The court
found no policy reason which supported the imposition of damages
beyond that which would fully compensate the plaintiff.
The policy basis for imposing punitive damages where the em-
ployer ratifies the employee's conduct is understandable. For ex-
ample, in Cashin v. Northern Pacific Railway,0 7 employees of the
railroad used dynamite blasts to aid their work, threatening a farm
family's lives and damaging the family's property. The railroad
ratified the employee's acts for three consecutive years by paying
damages. The fourth year a heavier charge was used which in-
flicted personal injury as well as property damage. The court al-
lowed punitive damages against the railroad for the acts of its
employees. The imposition of punitive damages in this instance
serves to warn employers that it will no longer be cheaper to risk
lives and pay damages, thereby providing an impetus for more pru-
dent future conduct.
dealing with tenants. An employee of the company, in accordance
with its usual methods, commits an unprovoked battery upon B, the
wife of the tenant, in order to induce her to leave. In an [action] by B
against A, punitive damages can properly be awarded.
2. A, the owner of a theatre, employs a special policeman to keep
order. In ejecting a small boy from the theatre, the policeman cruelly
abuses him. Upon learning the facts, A expresses his approval. Pu-
nitive damages can properly be awarded against A in an action for
the battery.
3. A, a corporation owning a series of retail stores, employs B as
operations manager to supervise the management of the units.
While visiting a unit B discovers facts which lead him to believe erro-
neously that one of the clerks has been stealing. He directs the local
manager to imprison the clerk. In the ensuing interview he permits
the local manager to use outrageous means of intimidation. In the
clerk's action against the corporation, punitive damages can properly
be awarded.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 909 comment b, illustration 1-3 (1939).
104. 147 U.S. 101 (1893).
105. Id. at 107.
106. Id. at 116.
107. 96 Mont. 92, 28 P.2d 862 (1934).
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The Restatement of Torts takes the preferred position by ab-
solving employers from liability for punitive damages when a prop-
erly supervised and trained employee acts outrageously and
allows punitive damages against employers who have participated
to some extent in the wrongdoing. Such a rule promotes the pur-
poses of punishment and deterrence by imposing punitive dam-
ages only upon those guilty of misconduct. Nevertheless, this rule
is criticized because a large damage award against an employer/
corporation results in increased costs to the public and punish-
ment of innocent shareholders10 8 While this argument may have
some merit in cases in which the shareholders are innocent of any
wrongdoing, the question may be asked as to whether the share-
holders should share in the responsibility for punitive damages
when they have been reaping the benefits of an employee's culpa-
ble conduct through increased profits. For example, in Toole v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,109 corporat6 employees covered up re-
ports and fictionalized data in order to receive FDA approval for a
new drug, MER/29, which purportedly inhibited cholesterol pro-
duction in the blood. After harmful side effects from the drug's use
began to appear, the corporation continued to deny a possible flaw
in the drug. Over 5,000 people were injured. The court awarded
$250,000110 in punitive damages finding that the defendant corpora-
tion had acted recklessly and in wanton disregard of possible harm
to others by marketing MER/29 even though it had knowledge of
the drug's harmful side effects."' The company had grossed
$7,000,000 from the sale of MER/29 in the first year." 2 With sales
ratios like those in Toole, punitive damages may be the best means
available to deter corporations from risking lives by recklessly
marketing known harmful products. If it is cheaper to pay com-
pensatory damages than to lose sales or create a safe product,
108. Critics of vicarious liability in any situation point to the fact that even though
the corporate officers, etc., may have ratified the agent's wrongdoing, the
eventual losers are the innocent shareholders and "in the vast majority of
cases, they do not benefit from the malicious tort." Entrepreneur, supra note
97, at 1307. The argument continues that since the shareholders wield very
limited power over corporate management, the effect of the punitive damage
award is purely compensatory to the plaintiff and not a deterrence to either
the culpable corporation or the innocent shareholders. Id.
One solution to the problem would be to impose personal liability on the
individuals who in fact authorized and executed the malicious conduct. Id. at
1309.
109. 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
110. The jury award of $500,000 in punitive damages was reduced by consent to
$250,000. Id. at 693-94, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
111. Id. at 713-15,60 Cal. Rptr. at 415-16. For a discussion of punitive damages con-
cerning the MER/29 cases, see Rheingold, The MER/29 Story-An Instance of
Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 CALIF. L. RE V. 116, 134-37 (1968).
112. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 701, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
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what incentive is there for a company, like Richardson-Merrill,
Inc., to proceed in an honest, safe manner?
B. Insurability of Punitive Damages
Related to vicarious liability is whether punitive damages
should be an insurable risk.113 The issue is twofold: (1) contract
interpretation, and (2) public policy. The focus here will be on
whether the insurability of punitive damages violates public pol-
icy. In Northwestern National Casualty Co. v. McNulty 114 the court
held that such insurance was against public policy. The court con-
cluded that to allow insurance for punitive damages would frus-
trate the purposes of punitive damages, and would punish society
for the wrongs of the insured by passing the loss on to premium
payers.n5 If insurance was allowed, "society would then be pun-
ishing itself for the wrong committed by the insured.""6 Public
policy reasons mandate that "the delinquent driver must not be
allowed to receive a windfall at the expense of the purchasers of
insurance, transferring his responsibility for punitive damages to
the very people-the driving public-to whom he is a menace."1 17
As one commentator reasoned, punitive damage insurance under-
mines the policies behind the award because "[i] nsurance cover-
age leaves the defendant unscathed, imposes the loss on innocent
policyholders, and accomplishes merely a windfall recovery for the
plaintiff."" 8 In Tedesco v. Maryland Casualty Co.,119 it was ob-
served that since insurance covering criminal fines would be
against public policy, there should be a similar result as to insur-
ance against losses brought about by the imposition of penalties
for public wrongs.
McNulty appears to have set the trend in this area 120 with only
limited contrary authority. 121 One such case, Lazenby v. Universal
113. For a discussion of contract interpretations, see King, The Insurability of Pu-
nitive Damages: A New Solution to an Old Dilemma, 16 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 345, 357-61 (1980).
114. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
115. Id. at 440-41.
116. Id. at 441.
117. Id. at 442.
118. McKilip, Punitive Damages in Illinois: Review and Reappraisal, 27 DE PAUL
L. REv. 571, 578 (1978).
119. 127 Conn. 533, 537, 18 A.2d 357, 359 (1941).
120. D. DOBBS, supra note 48, at 216 n.69.
121. See, e.g., Carroway v. Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 202-03, 139 S.E.2d 908, 909 (1965)
(although based on dubious precedent, the court held that "all sums" lan-
guage in the insurance policy included punitive damages); Southern Farm
Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 246 Ark. 849, 852, 440 S.W.2d 582, 584 (1969)
(held that line between punitive and compensatory damages was not clear
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.Underwriters Ins. Co. ,122 cited three reasons for allowing punitive
damage coverage: (1) most courts have found coverage as a matter
of contract interpretation,123 (2) a fine line divides the cases in
which punitive damages are recoverable from those cases in which
such damages are not recoverable, and (3) punitive damages do
not serve a deterrent function.124 The Lazenby court noted that to
strike down coverage on public policy grounds would be to rewrite
the insurance contract and dash the expectations of the insured,
something which "should [not] be done except in a clear case, and
the reasons advanced do not make such a clear case."12 5 Notwith-
standing Lazenby, it seems absurd to protect the contract interests
of the insured because to do so would be to allow him to freely
contract away the consequences of his own wrongdoing. There ap-
pears to be no logical reason for allowing insurance coverage for
wrongful acts because: (1) parties should not be permitted to con-
trol the risk which they are being insured against, and (2) punish-
ment and deterrence would be undermined.126
A limited exception to the prohibition against insurance for pu-
nitive damages has been recognized in cases in which the doctrine
of respondeat superior is applicable. 2 7 The leading case, Sterling
Insurance Co. v. Hughes,128 held that public policy was not violated
by allowing liability insurance coverage to include punitive dam-
ages where the insured principal had not participated in or author-
enough to allow coverage for one and not the other); Lazenby v. Universal
Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 648, 383 S.W.2d 1, 5 (1964).
122. 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
123. The court cited no authority for this proposition.
124. Arguments two and three were addressed by the Tenth Circuit in American
Sur. Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1966) where the court said:
This argument seems to miss the mark, for we may as well say crimi-
nal sanctions serve no useful purpose just because they are con-
stantly violated. The question is not so much the efficacy of the
policy underlying punitive damages; rather it is a question of the im-
plementation of that policy. Permitting the penalty for the misdeed
to be levied on one other than he who committed it cannot possibly
implement the policy.
Id. at 527.
125. 214 Tenn. at 648-49, 383 S.W.2d at 5.
126. Haskell, Punitive Damages: The Public Policy and the Insurance Policy, 58
ILL. B.J. 780, 789 (1970). Some courts have quibbled whether wanton or reck-
less conduct can be insured against. The logical solution, in order to uphold
the purposes of punitive damages, would be to disallow coverage for any con-
duct which woud give rise to punitive damages.
127. See Haskell, supra note 126, at 786-87; D. DOBBS, supra note 48, at 216.
128. 187 So. 2d 898, 900 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); cf. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v.
Reichard, 404 F.2d 868, 870 (5th Cir. 1968); LoRocco v. New Jersey Mfrs. In-
dem. Ins. Co., 82 N.J. Super. 323,332, 197 A.2d 591, 596 (1964); Esmond v. Liscio,
209 Pa. Super. 200, 214, 224 A.2d 793, 800 (1966) (dictum). See also Scott v.
Instant Parking Inc., 105 IlL App. 2d 133, 137-38, 245 N.E.2d 124, 126 (1969).
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ized the wrongdoing. Since in some jurisdictions principals are
held strictly liable in punitive damages for the torts of their agents,
it seems reasonable to allow an innocent principal to shift the bur-
den of such a loss to an insurer. It would not be objectionable on
public policy grounds because the principal was not guilty of any
wrongdoing and deterrence of the principal's conduct is
unnecessary.
C. Requirement of Actual Damages
It is generally held as a matter of law that the plaintiff must
establish actual damages before he will be permitted punitive
damages.12 9 The right to exemplary damages is merely an adjunct
to, and dependent upon, compensatory damages.130 A major con-
troversy is whether or not an award of nominal damages will sup-
port punitive damages. There is a split of authority between courts
which refuse to award punitive damages in this situation,131 and
those which allow punitive damages when nominal damages are
shown.132 The conflict is in part due to the differing circumstances
in which punitive damages are sought. First is the case where the
plaintiff has no claim and is unable to prove actual loss. Second is
the situation in which the plaintiff can show an injury, but no mea-
surable harm. Consider the following example provided by Pro-
129. See, e.g., Mobil Bldg. & Loan Assoc. v. Odom., 232 Ala. 19, 21-22, 166 So. 698, 700
(1936); Longinotti v. Rhodes, 215 Ark. 380, 383, 220 S.W.2d 812, 814 (1949); Cha-
vez v. Times-Mirror Co., 72 Cal. App. 694, 697, 237 P. 1085, 1086-87 (1925); Liv-
ingston v. Utah-Colorado Land & Live Stock Co., 106 Colo. 278, 279, 103 P.2d
684, 685 (1940); Kinney v. Cady, 232 Iowa 403, 412, 4 N.W.2d 225, 229 (1942);
Behymer v. Milgram Food Stores, Inc., 151 Kan. 921, 923, 101 P.2d 912, 913-14
(1940); Clancy'v. Reid-Ward Motor Co., 237 Mo. App. 1000, 1008-09, 170 S.W.2d
161, 165 (1943); Brown v. Higby, 191 Okla. 173, 174-75, 127 P.2d 195, 196 (1942).
For an extensive list of cases, see Annot., 17 A.IR.2d 527, 530-32 (1951).
130. See 17 A.L.R.2d 527 (1951).
131. Holding that a mere "technical" invasion of a right cannot be sufficiently seri-
ous to warrant punishment, a number of courts disallow punitive damages
when actual damage awards are nominal. See Anderson v. Alcus, 42 S.W.2d
294, 296 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) (holding nominal damages are not compensa-
tion for injury done, but rather vindication of the invasion of a technical right,
and insufficient to support punitive damages); Martel v. Hall Oil Co., 36 Wyo.
166,253 P. 862, reh'g denied, 36 Wyo. 187,255 P. 3 (1927) (nominal damages are
not actual damages and there is no right to punitive damages); cf. Ennis v.
Brawley, 129 W. Va. 621, 41 S.E.2d 680 (1946) (holding that nominal damages
mean the jury has found no injury and thus any punishment should be left to
the criminal law). See, Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 527, 544 (1951).
132. Cf. Finney v. Lockhart, 35 Cal. 2d 161, 217 P.2d 19 (1950) (holding that nominal
damages constituted actual damages); Crystal Dome Oil & Gas Co. v. Savic,
51 Idaho 409, 6 P.2d 155 (1931) (holding that the mere showing of a violation of
a legal right was sufficient to support punitive damages). See Annot., 17
A.L.R.2d 527, 543 (1951).
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fessor Dobbs:'3
In a negligence case.., there is no cause of action at all merely because
the defendant misbehaves; he may be liable criminally for driving 90 miles
per hour down main street, but, unless he causes harm, he is not civilly
liable, not even for nominal damages. If he has caused no harm at all in
such a case, there is no claim at all against him, and this necessarily ex-
cludes any claim for punitive damages. On'the other hand, there are cases
in which the defendant is liable without causing any demonstrable harm,
of either pecuniary or any other kind. He may be liable for at least nomi-
nal damages, and perhaps substantial damages, for an assault, even
though he never succeeds in touching the plaintiff.' 34
Obviously, punitive damages should not be allowed when a
cause of action does not exist. But what about the situation where
the cause of action does exist, yet results in no pecuniary harm?
This may be the situation in which punitive damages are most
needed because even though compensable harm is not shown, the
defendant's wrongful conduct is nonetheless potentially harmful.
If punitive damages are not allowed the admonitory function of
tort law is obstructed and wrongful conduct is not deterred.135
When a person shoots into a crowd narrowly missing the plaintiff,
the plaintiff's actual harm is negligible, yet punitive damages are
necessary in order to punish and forestall similar conduct in the
future.
Another problem with the actual damage requirement is that
juries often find for the plaintiff on the merits and award only ex-
emplary damages, either by mistakenly lumping compensatory
and punitive damages together or by failing to assess nominal
damages.136 Some courts rigidly refuse punitive damages for fail-
ure of compensatory damages.137 Other courts, applying a more
liberal interpretation of the rule, allow punitive damages to stand
once it is shown that a cause of action was found to exist. 3 8 In
Clark v. McClurg'39 the jury awarded only exemplary damages.
The appellant challenged the award as violative of the requirement
of actual damages. The appellate court held: "[Tihe fact that the
jury, inadvertently or by some mischance, assessed the entire
damages as exemplary, instead of segregating them, constitutes an
133. D. DOBBS, supra note 48, at 208.
134. Id. (emphasis added).
135. See Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARv. L. REV. 517, 529
(1957) [hereinafter cited as Torts].
136. See id. at 529.
137. See, e.g., Richard v. Hunter, 151 Ohio St. 185, 85 N.E.2d 109 (1949); Toler v.
Cassinelli, 129 W. Va. 591, 41 S.E.2d 672 (1946).
138. See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Benatar, 99 Cal. App. 2d 393,400-02,221 P.2d 965,
970 (1950); Edwards v. Nulsen, 347 Mo. 1077, 1086, 152 S.W.2d 28, 32 (1941);
Fauver v. Wilkoske, 123 Mont. 228, 233-34, 211 P.2d 420, 426 (1949).
139. 215 Cal. 279, 9 P.2d 505 (1932) (en banc).
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error of form rather than of substance." 140
Clark states the best reading of the rule: The threshold re-
quirement to support an award of punitive damages is the exist-
ence of a cause of action. The alternative reading that punitive
damages are conditioned upon actual pecuniary injury, under-
mines the deterrent function of punitive damages. Professor
Dobbs surmized that the alternative reading of the rule is just an
indirect criticism of the doctrine of punitive damages itself: "If the
criticisms [of punitive damages] are not persuasive enough to war-
rant rejection of all punitive awards, then there is no reason to
make them depend upon the award of actual damages, except in
the sense that the plaintiff must have some cause of action before
recovery is appropriate."141
D. Requirement That Punitive Award be Commensurate with
Compensatory Award
After a plaintiff has shown "actual" damage, many courts seek
to limit the punitive award by requiring it to be commensurate
with the actual damage award. 142 The trend, however, appears to
be a movement against the ratio rule.143
A ratio rule flies in the face of the procedure in most jurisdic-
tions which allows evidence of the defendant's wealth to be admit-
ted and used to gage punishment.44 This procedure requires the
punitive award to be calculated so as to tailor punishment by bas-
ing the award on the defendant's ability to pay, while the ratio rule
requires proportioning the award to any compensation granted. 45
Evidence of wealth maximizes punishment while the ratio ap-
proach attempts to control the amount of the award. Furthermore,
the ratio rule is an unnecessary mechanism to curb jury abuse and
control punitive awards because courts already have the ability to
lessen excessive awards. 4 6
It appears that most courts reject the idea that the ratio rule
140. Id. at 284, 9 P.2d at 507.
141. D. DOBBS, supra note 48, at 210.
142. This is seen as a way of curbing jury abuse due to the great flexibility given a
jury in fashioning relief. Cf. Hall Oil Co. v. Barquin, 33 Wyo. 92, 155-58, 237 P.
255, 277-78 (1925) (court observed that a lack of proportion between actual
and punitive indicated passion and prejudice). See Annot., 17 A.LR.2d 527,
548-49 (1951).
143. See, e.g., Bucher v. Krause, 200 F.2d 576, 587-88 (7th Cir. 1952); Pinckard v.
Dunnavant, 281 Ala. 533, 538, 206 So. 2d 340,344 (1968); United Const. Workers
v. Laburnum Const. Corp., 194 Va. 872, 895, 75 S.E.2d 694, 709 (1953), affd, 347
U.S. 656 (1954).
144. See supra note 63-65 & accompanying text.
145. See D. DOBBS, supra note 48, at 210-11.
140. See discussion on remittitur at note 66 supra.
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requires a fixed mathematical ratio between the two awards.147
The ambiguity of the rule, however, has resulted in reversals of
awards only slightly in excess of actual damages,148 and afflir-
mances of awards many times as great as actual damages.149
As a matter of sound tort policy, the ratio rule is questionable.
It undermines the deterrent effect of punitive damages by
stressing the actual resultant harm rather than the social undesir-
ability of the defendant's conduct. Compensatory damages may
be the only guide for determining punitive damages, but even if
they are the only guide, it does not mean that their value as a
gauge of punitive damages is enhanced.
To place the two in formulaic relation.., is to deny any real function to
punitive damages, for where the jury's formula for compensatory damages
permits large recovery, punitive damages are needed least. Turned
around, the argument is also sound: If punitive damages have a core func-
tion, it exists in the case in which compensatory damages are nominal or
small.1 50
To summarize, the major problem with the ratio test is that the
actual injury sustained may bear little relationship, if any, to the
amount of an award which would be an effective deterrent. It is
the act which causes the injury that should be the focal point, not
the consequences of the act. Again, in the hypothetical case where
someone shoots into a crowd, should the civil punishment and de-
terrence provided through punitive damages be less severe in the
first case where no actual injury occurs than in the second case
where someone is killed? Does the fact that one's intent is not ac-
complished suggest that he should be punished less severely?
Reason suggests that if society is to forestall such conduct in the
future, damages should be awarded not according to the serious-
ness of the harm, but, instead, according to the seriousness of the
act. Focusing on the harm serves only the reparative function of
the law, not the admonitory function.
The anomaly of the ratio award is best seen by studying its ef-
fects. When a potentially harmful act results in a slight injury, a
plaintiff receives small compensatory and small punitive damage
147. Torts, supra note 135, at 530.
148. See, e.g., Hunter v. Kansas City Rys., 213 Mo. App. 233, 244-45, 248 S.W. 998,
1002-03 (1923); Mitchell v. Randal, 288 Pa. 518, 522, 137 A. 171, 173 (1927);
Ridner v. York Haven Water and Power Co., 251 Pa. 18, 26-27, 95 A. 803, 806
(1915).
149. Cf. Johnson Publishing Co. v. Davis, 271 Ala. 474, 490, 124 So. 2d 441, 453 (1960)
(held punitive damages may greatly exceed compensatory damages);
Tynberg v. Cohen, 76 Tex. 409, 417, 13 S.W. 315, 316-17 (1890) (ratio of 40:1 was
not unreasonable); Malco, Inc. v. Midwest Aluminum Sales, 14 Wis. 2d 57, 66,
109 N.W.2d 516, 521 (1961) (fifteen times compensatory damages is not unrea-
sonable per se).
150. Childres, Remedies, 1965 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 289, 291 (1966).
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awards; the defendant is deterred and punished only slightly.'15
When the same act results in significant harm, the plaintiff re-
ceives a substantial compensatory damages award, which, alone,
should deter the defendant, and, also, a substantial punitive dam-
age award. The defendant in the latter situation may be punished
too severely when the award as a whole is considered. Thus, the
ratio rule "may limit punitive damage awards when they should be
severe, and result in heavy punitive damages when they should be
lenient."152 If punitive damages are to remain an effective means
of controlling future conduct, the admonitory purpose must not be
vitiated through rigid adherence to a ratio rule. Rather than apply-
ing the ratio test, courts should balance the following factors in
fashioning appropriate relief: (1) severity of threatened harm,153
(2) degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct,15 4
(3) profitability of conduct, 5 5 (4) wealth of defendant,156 and
(5) possible criminal sanctions.157
E. Mass Disaster Litigation
The problem of multiple suits against one defendant for the
same act has caused considerable stir and prompted courts and
commentators to search for solutions. 5 8 An injury to multiple
plaintiffs coupled with multiple punitive damage awards could
bankrupt a defendant. Another consequence of uncoordinated
suits could be that plaintiffs litigating early could exhaust a de-
fendant's assets with punitive damage awards, leaving subsequent
151. Morris, supra note 8, at 1182.
152. Id.
153. If the potential harm flowing from the defendant's conduct is slight, he should
receive only a small punitive damage award. If, however, the potential for
harm is grievous, a more severe sanction is warranted. Mallor & Roberts,
supra note 11, at 667.
154. The need for deterrence increases as the defendant's conduct becomes more
reckless. The court should look at past conduct and defendant's awareness of
the hazard. Id at 667.
155. Punitive damage awards must remove the profit incentive of defendant. De-
fendant should be forced to disgorge profits and pay additional sums. Id. -at
667-68.
156. See supra notes 63-65 & accompanying text.
157. In order to effectuate the purpose of punitive damages and still allow for
criminal sanctions, a court should look at the defendant's total potential pun-
ishment and determine if punitive damages are appropriate. Mallor & Rob-
erts, supra note 11, at 668.
158. See generally Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74
MIcH. L. REv. 1258 (1976); Rheingold, The MER/29 Story-An Instance of Suc-
cesslul Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 CAW'. L. REV. 116 (1968); Schulkin, Mass
Liability and Punitive Damages Overkill, 30 HAsmCroS L.J. 1797 (1979); Note,
Punitive Damages in Product Liability Cases, 16 SArTA CiARA L REV. 895
(1976).
1982]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
plaintiffs without even a compensatory award. The problem is par-
ticularly evident in the products liability situation where hundreds
or thousands of individual plaintiffs situated in numerous states
bring different actions in various state and federal courts.159 Some
control is needed in this area to assure full compensation without
bankrupting the defendant or preventing him from marketing new
products which would be socially beneficial. The problem is to for-
mulate a solution which adequately punishes and deters a defend-
ant, but at the same time allows adequate compensation to all
meritorious plaintiffs.
Too frequently a culpable defendant is relieved of civil punish-
ment because he injured multiple plaintiffs, when he would have
been assessed punitive damages had he injured only one.160 Aboli-
tion of punitive damages in mass disaster litigation would not ade-
quately serve the retributive needs of society. Although the
imposition of compensatory damages to hundreds of plaintiffs may
punish a defendant quite severely, it must be noted that there is no
public policy argument against liability insurance for compensa-
tory damages, and to the extent such insurance is available, puni-
tive and deterrent effects will be avoided.16l Therefore, even in
mass disaster litigation punitive damages are vital. But the sub-
stantial risk of excessive damages demands control as the litiga-
tion progresses.16 2
Given the problem of litigation in various forums, it would be
impracticable, if not impossible, to combine all suits into one.163
159. Schulkin, supra note 158, at 1799.
160. Cf. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967) (punitive
damages denied altogether); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App.
2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967) (punitive damage award was reduced from
$500,000 to $250,000 because many untried cases were pending); Ostopowitz v.
Win. S. Merrell Co., No. 5879-1963 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Westchester County, Jan. 11,
1967) (punitive damages reduced from $850,000 to $100,000 because the jury
did not know of other cases pending).
161. Even if insurance is insufficient to pay all claims, many potential plaintiffs
will not bring suit due to the economical burden placed on them in a suit
without punitive damages.
These are the "forgotten plaintiffs" who are left without redress
under a system that only permits compensatory damages. These are
precisely the plaintiffs helped by punitive damages awards, for such
awards make litigation of minor claims economical and, as the
number of substantial recoveries are increasingly publicized, they
help to inform both injured consumers of their rights and lawyers of
the desirability of litigating such claims.
Owen, supra note 158, at 1323.
162. For a general survey of the proposed solutions to this problem by various
comentators, see Schulkin, supra note 158, at 1800-08.
163. One author, however, has proposed that Congress could provide legislation
that would allow for such lawsuits. This suggests to all defendants to bring a
"reverse class-action" suit for the determination of an appropriate punitive
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An alternative solution would be co allow the judge to assess puni-
tive damages in view of the total punishment to which a defendant
is subject, giving great weight to prior awards in mitigation. This
has been criticized as giving a windfall to initial plaintiffs.164 Still,
it must be remembered that no plaintiff has a right to punitive
damages. Awarding of damages lies completely within the jury's
discretion.165 Punitive damages are made not for the benefit of an
individual plaintiff, but for the benefit of society, and subsequent
plaintiffs are not deprived of a personal or property right. Al-
though the first plaintiff may receive a windfall, it may be justified
because of the enormous amount of diligence, imagination, and
financial resources that the individual must expend to "blaze the
trail," and prove the defendant's misconduct. It may well be that
subsequent plaintiffs merely ride to favorable settlements and ver-
dicts on the coattails of initial plaintiffs.166
Another problem with this approach is that the jury is placed in
the position of having to predict future jury awards. 67 Aside from
this obvious difficulty, admissibility of evidence regarding past and
pending cases may cause several other adverse effects. First, the
jury may be unduly prejudiced by the punitive awards given by
other juries and "jump on the bandwagon."168 Also, the jury may
damage award. Under the plan, the plaintiffs would still bring compensatory
damage claims in the forum of their choice, but they would have to join the
large punitive suit if they wanted a share of the punitive damage award. The
award of punitive damages would be held for a period of time and then dis-
tributed pro rata. Riley, Punitive Damages: The Doctrine of Just Enrichment,
27 DRAKE L. REV. 195, 252 (1977-78).
164. See, Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 840 (2d Cir. 1967); Vol-
lert v. Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1348, 1351 (D. Hawaii 1975).
165. See, e.g., Stoody Co. v. Royer, 374 F.2d 672, 680 (10th Cir. 1967); Denham v.
Southwestern Bell TeL, 415 F. Supp. 530, 535 (W.D. Okla. 1976); White v. B.K.
Trucking Co., 405 F. Supp. 1068, 1071 (W.D. Okla. 1975); Louisville & N. R.R. v.
Street, 164 Ala. 155, 158-59, 51 So. 306, 307 (1909); Smith v. Hill, 12 Ill. 2d 588,
595, 147 N.E.2d 321, 325 (1958).
166. See Owen, supra note 158, at 1325.
Thus, while courts must be especially vigilant to control the very
real, but by no means certain, risk of excessive punishment in mass
disaster cases, the initial plaintiffs in appropriate cases should re-
ceive punitive damages awards that reward their efforts. Plaintiffs
following soon thereafter, whose successful prosecutions of punitive
damages claims confirm the first award, should be permitted to re-
cover enhanced punitive damages awards for similar reasons. There-
after, however, punitive damages recoveries should probably be
limited to reasonable costs of litigation.
Id.
167. See Schulkin, supra note 158, at 1806-07.
168. Professor Morris suggests that this could open pandora's box:
[F] or juries might assume that since the defendant has once been
found guilty, their verdict must necessarily be against him. They
might also fail to see that the defendant has already been punished
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tend to confuse the purpose of punitive damages by focusing its
award on "defendant's conduct vis-a-vis the plaintiff."169 Again,
this would be an incorrect interpretation of the purpose of punitive
damages: The award benefits society as a whole by deterring fu-
ture conduct, and the plaintiff's receipt of the award is merely a
means to that end. The folly of requiring the trier of fact to predict
subsequent outcomes is best seen by the MER/129170 cases where
the judges reduced the punitive awards because of the possibility
of multiple litigation.
V. CONCLUSION
Punitive damages are a necessary tool in the effective control of
socially undesirable conduct. Although the criminal law serves as
the major source of deterrence in society, it is not all inclusive and,
as such, limits society's control over behavior. Punitive damages
must be allowed to fill the gaps the criminal law leaves open. Per-
sons should not be allowed to profit at the expense of society with-
out at least the risk of severe sanctions. Punitive damages will at a
minimum cause people to reconsider the potential effects of their
actions before engaging in potentially harmful conduct. While pu-
nitive damages should not be allowed to duplicate the criminal
law, they should be allowed as a supplement.
Lisa M. Broman '82
in part, and might feel it their duty to punish him more severely be-
cause of the injury to others than the plaintiff.
Morris, supra note 8, at 1195 n.40.
169. Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 850, 856 (M.D. Pa. 1974). Here the
court held that the plaintiff could not receive punitive damages representing
the impact of a defective drug on the whole society but instead must focus on
defendant's conduct vis-a-vis the plaintiff.
170. See supra notes 109, 160 and accompanying text.
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